The proper protection of animals

Abstract

This article addresses the debate on the defense of animals, analyzing whether they should be considered subjects of law or whether it is more appropriate for them to be objects of law with special protection. To this end, it analyzes their capacity for sentience and the intrinsic value they possess as living beings in order to justify the human duty not to harm them and to protect them. In turn, it explores the notion of a subject of law and analyzes whether it belongs to animals. It then reviews emblematic cases, such as those of the chimpanzee Suica, Sandra the orangutan, and Cecilia the chimpanzee, the seven canaries, Poli the dog, Estrellita the monkey, and the Peruvian case of Run Run, the fox, in which these have been recognized as subjects of law, granting them legal protection. However, this position is criticized, arguing that the legal conception of a subject of law, applied to animals, distorts its meaning. Thus, instead, it is proposed to consider animals as a tertium genus, that is, an intermediate category between subjects and objects deserving of special protection without granting them full rights. This is because the proposal seeks a more realistic, comprehensive, and coherent defense for all animals, avoiding the limitations of current approaches that only protect certain groups, such as domestic animals or wild animals in captivity.